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RECENT DECISIONS
such an organization, where the enforcement of a substantive right
under the United States Constitution is involved.23  The English
courts have taken a similar view and have held that a union may be
sued in its registered name.24
It is submitted that the law as it stands today in New York is
inequitable. An organization the size of a labor union, which oc-
cupies such an important place in our economy, should be made to
answer for tortious acts committed in its name, without being per-
mitted to raise, as a condition precedent to its liability, the establish-
ment of the individual responsibility of each of its members. If the
courts in their capacity as interpreters of the law feel it impossible
so to construe the statute as it presently exists, it would seem desir-
able that the law be changed.
WILLs - ADmINISTRATOR C.T.A. - WHO MAY QUALIFY.-
Testator had named his widow sole beneficiary and executrix. Prior
to probate of the will, his widow died, naming a bank her executor.
The bank, however, declined to administer testator's estate. Tes-
tator's sister, claiming to be his next of kin within the meaning of
the Surrogate's Court Act, although not entitled to share in his
estate,1 petitioned for letters of administration c.t.a.2 In denying
private statutes for the better government of the corporation' .... Yet these
associations lack that first indicium of corporateness, a charter. They cannot,
in most jurisdictions, be sued in their own names.").
21 See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., smpra note 20 at 38S.
"It would be unfortunate if an organization with as great power as this Inter-
national Union has . .. in a wide territory .. . could assemble its assets to
be used . . . free from liability for injuries [resulting from their] . . .
torts . .. ."
22 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., supra note 20; see Faby,
supra note 2.
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
2 4 Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Society of Ry. Servants, [1901] A. C.
426. In 1906, the Trades Disputes Act was passed, providing that "(1) An
action against a trade union .. .or against any members or officials thereof
in respect of any tortious act alleged to have been committed by or on
behalf of the trade union, shall not be entertained by any court.
"(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the liability of the trustees of a
trade union to be sued in the events provided for by the Trade Union Act,
1871 . .. except in respect of any tortious act committed by or on behalf of
the union in contemplation or in furtherance of a trade dispute." Trades Dis-
putes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. VII, c. 47, § 4. See cases construing this statute cited
in Note, 27 A. L. R. 786, 797 (1923).
1 N. Y. DEC. EsT. Lmw § 83 (4). Since the estate was valued at less than
$10,000.00, decedent's sister was not entitled to participate under this statute.
2 An administrator c.t.a. (i.e., with the will annexed) is a person appointed
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petitioner the letters, the court reversed the decision of the Appellate
Division and held that within the meaning of the Surrogate's Court
Act, "next of kin" are those actually entitled to share in the estate.3
Matter of Murphy, 304 N. Y. 232, 106 N. E. 2d 906 (1952).
The right to administer an estate does not arise because of in-
terest in the estate or relationship per se, but rather interest and re-
lationship are made relevant by statute.4 In New York, the right
has always been conferred upon persons interested in the estate, in
the belief that their economic interest and the bond of consanguinity
would induce them to administer in a wiser fashion than one without
this interest.5 The statutory provision regulating the granting of
letters of administration c.t.a. stipulates that, except as to the order
of priority it enumerates, the requirements of the section governing
administration in case of intestacy shall apply.6 Though the order
of priority among the various classes of persons entitled to letters
of administration c.t.a. and in the event of intestacy is mandatory,7
the Surrogate may exercise discretion within certain classes entitled
to letters of administration c.t.a.8
The New York statute provides categories of persons entitled to
letters of administration c.t.a., among whom are the "next of kin." 9
Early American decisions interpreted this phrase to mean a person
who is a distributee.' 0  Later, in Lathrop v. Smith," the New York
by the surrogate "[i]f no person is named as executor in the will or selected
by virtue of a power contained therein or if at any time there is no executor
or administrator with the will annexed qualified to act. . . ." N. Y. Sum. CT.
Acr § 133 (1952).
3 The court declared the necessity of construing the N. Y. Sum. CT. Acr
H8 118, 133, together with the N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW §§ 47-c, 83.
4 See Matter of D'Agostino, 88 Misc. 371, 375, 151 N. Y. Supp. 957, 959
(Surr. Ct. 1914).
5See Matter of Campbell, 192 N. Y. 312, 315, 85 N. E. 392, 393 (1908).
6 N. Y. Sum. CT. Acr § 133. "Except as to the right of priority as pro-
vided in this section, the provisions of section one hundred and eighteen of this
act apply to an application for letters of administration with the will annexed."
This has been construed as applying only to the next of kin. Matter of
Thompson, 186 Misc. 528, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 508 (Surr. Ct. 1938). Contra:
Matter of Baume, 160 Misc. 563, 290 N. Y. Supp. 981 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
7 N. Y. CODF CiV. PROC. § 2660, construed in Matter of Campbell, supra
note 5; Matter of Wolff, 161 App. Div. 255, 146 N. Y. Supp. 495 (1st Dep't
1914) ; N. Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 118 (successor to above-mentioned § 2660), con-
strued in Matter of Weitz, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 840 (Surr. Ct. 1944); Matter of
Karp, 163 Misc. 855, 298 N. Y. Supp. 903 (Surr. Ct. 1937). See Matter of
Irland, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 248, 253 (Surr. Ct. 1947) (construction of Surr. Ct.
Act § 133).
s Matter of Krackenberger, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 408 (Surr. Ct. 1949) ; Matter
of Thompson, supra note 6.
9N. Y. Sum. CT. ACr § 133(4). "If there is no such legatee or none
who will accept, then to the husband, or wife, or to one or more of the next of
kin, or to one or more of the heirs or devisees, so qualified." (Emphasis added.)
10 Public Administrator v. Peters, 1 Bradf. 100 (N. Y. 1849). See Public
Administrator v. Hughes, 1 Bradf. 125, 127 (N. Y. 1850).
2124 N. Y. 417, 35 Barb. 64 (1862).
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Court of Appeals ruled that all persons who might be entitled to
participate in the distribution of the estate in the event of intestacy
have a right to letters of administration in the order enumerated by
statute. Over a period of time subsequent to the Lathrop case, sev-
eral changes were made in the wording of the statute.'2 This state
of flux was reflected in decisional law, since some courts followed
Lathrop v. Smith,'3 while others continued to adhere to the prior
rule.14  In a 1914 opinion,15 Judge Cardozo stated that it was not
necessary that a next of kin actually share in the distribution of the
estate; but he refused to state his reasons, asserting that a statute
which was to become effective after the decision would produce a new
rule and render obsolete the Lathrop decision.
This 1914 amendment substituted the words "entitled to take or
share in the (decedent's) personal property" for the phrase "entitled
to succeed." 16 The reported decisions of lower courts have recog-
nized this statutory change by consistently holding that "next of kin"
meant one who would actually share in the estate.1 7 In 1951, the
First Department of the Appellate Division, in Matter of Murphy,1s
ignored these rulings, and adhered to the construction established by
the Court of Appeals in the Lathrop case. The Murphy decision
would have created confusion on this point of law, inasmuch as it
was a binding precedent on the Surrogate's Courts of the Depart-
ment, while the other three departments could continue to rule as
they had since the 1914 amendment became effective.
In reversing the decision of the First Department, the Court of
Appeals upheld the policy followed in the other departments. Rely-
ing on the reasoning of the courts subsequent to the 1914 amendment,
it held that by "next of kin" was meant one who would actually share
in the distribution of the estate.
12 In 1863 that statute relating to letters of administration was amended
to read: "This section shall not be construed to authorize the granting of let-
ters to any relative not entitled to succeed to the personal estate of the deceased
as his next of kin at the time of his decease." Laws of N. Y. 1863, c. 362, § 3.
In 1867 this amendment was deleted. Laws of N. Y. 1867, c. 782, § 27. In
1893 the language "would be entitled to succeed to his personal property" was
changed to "entitled to succeed to his personal property." Laws of N. Y.
1893, Vol. 2, c. 686, § 2660.
1.3 Matter of Blake, 60 Misc. 627, 113 N. Y. Supp. 944 (Surr. Ct. 1903);
Matter of Lowenstein, 29 Misc. 722, 62 N. Y. Supp. 819 (Surr. Ct. 1899).
14 Matter of Wolff, 161 App. Div. 255, 146 N. Y. Supp. 495 (1st Dep't
1914) ; Matter of Kroog, 84 Misc. 676, 147 N. Y. Supp. 887 (Surr. Ct. 1914);
Matter of Seymour, 33 Misc. 271, 68 N. Y. Supp. 638 (Surr. Ct. 1900).
Is See Matter of D'Adamo, 212 N. Y. 214, 218, 106 N. E. 81, 82 (1914).
16 Laws of N. Y. 1914, c. 443, § 2588. "Administration in case of intestacy
must be granted to the Persons entitled to take or share in the personal prop-
erty ...." (emphasis added).
17 Matter of Grant, 253 App. Div. 504, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 867 (2d Dep't 1938);
Matter of Franco, 169 Misc. 356, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 594 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; Matter
of Elder, 87 Misc. 79, 150 N. Y. Supp. 114 (Surr. Ct. 1914).
's 278 App. Div. 51, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 148 (1st Dep't 1951).
1952 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
This is the first authoritative ruling on the definition of "next
of kin" since the above mentioned amendment became effective. The
result has been to check conflicting interpretations among the various
departments of the Appellate Division. 9
M
WILLS-DUPLICATE WILLS-RETENTION OF BOTH BY TESTATOR
DURING His LIFE.-Decedent executed her will in duplicate and re-
tained both copies. After her death, the ribbon copy was missing and
only the carbon copy offered for probate. The contestant argued
that, since all the executed copies were not produced, there arose a
presumption of revocation of the will. In reversing a decree deny-
ing probate, the Appellate Division held that, since both copies were
retained by the decedent, the discovery of one of them at her death
is sufficient to support a jury's finding of non-revocation. Matter
of Mittelstaedt, 280 App. Div. 163, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 166 (1st Dep't
1952).
When a single will has been executed and it is established that
it was not within the testator's possession or control prior to his
death, no presumption of revocation arises in the event that the will
is missing.' Any such presumption would be entirely overcome by
the inaccessibility of the instrument to the testator and the conse-
quent improbability of his having destroyed it.2 However, when a
single will is last traced to the testator and, upon his death, cannot
be found, there arises the presumption that he destroyed it animo
revocandi.3 The disappearance is presumed intentional, in the latter
case, because of the ambulatory character of the will, coupled with
its availability to the testator.4
The presumption of revocation, in such circumstances, may be
rebutted by proof that the will was ".... in existence at the time of
the testator's death, or was fraudulently destroyed in his life-
time . . . ." 5 The burden of such proof is on the proponent.0 . It
19 A recent amendment substituted "persons interested in the estate" for
"next of kin." Laws of N. Y. 1952, c. 350, § 133 (effective Sept. 1, 1952). By
definition, "next of kin" are included among "persons interested in the estate."
N. Y. SURR. CT. Acr § 314(10).
1 Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N. Y. 653 (1866).
2 See id. at 654.
3 Matter of Staiger, 243 N. Y. 468, 154 N. E. 312, reversing 217 App.
Div. 743, 216 N. Y. Supp. 920 (1st Dep't 1926); Matter of Kennedy, 167 N. Y.
163, 60 N. E. 442 (1901), affirming 53 App. Div. 105, 65 N. Y. Supp. 879
(1st Dep't 1900); Collyer v. Collyer, 110 N. Y. 481, 18 N. E. 110 (1888);
accord, Matter of Cunnion, 201 N. Y. 123, 94 N. E. 648 (1911).
4 See Matter of Kennedy, sufta note 3 at 168, 60 N. E. at 443; Betts v.
Jackson, 6 Wend. 173, 181 (N. Y. 1830).
5 N. Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 143.
6 Matter of Staiger, 243 N. Y. 468, 154 N. E. 312, reversing 217 App.
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